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A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY
Cyberattacks and the Constitution
MATTHEW C. WAXMAN Aegis Series Paper No. 2007
The United States has one of the world’s strongest and most sophisticated capabilities to 
launch cyberattacks against adversaries. How does the US Constitution allocate power to use 
that capability? And what does that allocation tell us about appropriate executive-legislative-
branch arrangements for setting and implementing cyber strategy?
The term “cyberattack” is often used loosely. In this essay, I define a cyberattack as action 
that involves the use of computer code to disrupt, degrade, destroy, or manipulate computer 
systems or networks or the information on them.1 I am not including cyber operations that 
are purely for information gathering or to map foreign networks in preparation for future 
cyberattacks.
This definition of cyberattack still includes a wide array of operations. On one end are 
attacks on computer systems that have effects—including kinetic, sometimes violent 
ones—outside those systems. Examples include the Stuxnet attack that brought down 
some of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and the 2017 NotPetya attack, widely attributed to Russia, 
that targeted major Ukrainian companies and government agencies but spread widely 
and disabled computers—as well as commerce dependent on them—around the globe.2 
At the other end are the types of low-level and often discrete attacks that appear to be 
contemplated by the United States “Defend Forward” concept. Examples include infiltrating 
adversary networks and deleting or corrupting data, or US Cyber Command’s operations 
that disrupted the networks of Russia’s infamous “Internet Research Agency” troll farm in 
the run-up to the 2018 US midterm elections.3 There are of course many possibilities in 
between.
This essay offers a way to think about the constitutional distribution of powers 
between the president and Congress governing the use of US cyberattack capabilities. 
Some commentators and analysts view this problem almost reflexively as a “war 
powers” issue—a term I use throughout this essay to refer to the political branches’ 
respective constitutional authority over the hostile use of military force. That is especially 
true as one moves up the scale of expected damage.4 A corollary to that constitutional 
issue is a statutory question: Namely, how should the 1973 War Powers Resolution, 
which was intended to restrict extensive military hostilities without congressional 
approval, be interpreted or amended to account for cyberattacks?5 The imprecise rhetoric 
of “cyberwar,” “cyber conflict,” and “cyberattacks” probably contributes to this legal 
framing.
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But many—and probably almost all—cyberattacks undertaken by the United States cannot 
plausibly be viewed as exercises of war powers. Indeed, the entire Defend Forward concept 
appears to involve low-level operations well below the “use of force” threshold under 
international law and far short of the types of operations that have typically triggered war 
powers analysis under domestic constitutional law.
This essay argues that as a conceptual and doctrinal matter, cyberattacks alone are rarely 
exercises of war powers—and they might never be. They are often instead best understood 
as exercises of other, nonwar military powers, foreign affairs powers, intelligence powers, 
and foreign commerce powers, among other constitutional powers not yet articulated. 
Although this more fine-grained and fact-specific constitutional conception of cyberattacks 
leaves room for broad executive leeway in some operational contexts, this discretion is 
often the result of congressional delegation or acquiescence as opposed to any inherent 
constitutional authority on the part of the president. At the same time, these alternative 
understandings of cyberattacks also contain a strong constitutional basis for Congress to 
pursue legislative regulation of the procedural and substantive parameters governing cyber 
operations.
Beyond those descriptive claims, this essay argues that a rush to treat cyberattacks 
as implicating war powers misguides criticisms about the role Congress is or is not 
playing in regulating cyberattacks. This is because participants in war powers debates 
often bring intense and polar normative stances about the appropriate institutional 
arrangements governing the exercise of those powers. On one end are those who 
prize executive speed, agility, and secrecy—and therefore presidential freedom from 
congressional interference. On the other end are those who see formal congressional 
approval for military campaigns as being of paramount constitutional importance. The 
latter, who want to roll back presidential unilateralism, often see cyberattacks as yet 
another problematic means by which presidents can evade proper congressional checks 
on war. But in their focus on congressional approval for military intervention, and by 
extension for at least some high-intensity cyberattacks, those critics may overlook other 
institutional arrangements that are better tailored to US cyber strategy, especially to the 
sort of lower-intensity activities that make up Defend Forward. They also may overlook 
the many important ways in which Congress is already actively involved in shaping and 
facilitating that strategy.
Cyberattacks as Exercising War Powers?
Suppose the executive branch launches an operation that, through infiltration of foreign 
computer networks and insertion of code, disables an adversary’s air defense system, knocks 
offline parts of its banking system, or takes over control of its intelligence service’s social 
media accounts. Or suppose that a US cyber operation ruins an adversary’s ballistic missile 
test, temporarily shuts down some internal government communications, or disrupts a 
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state-owned business’s operations. These direct effects might be small and temporary, but in 
some cases they might be large and long term. Assuming that such operations do not take 
place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict (and putting aside for now any additional 
statutory authorities or prohibitions), what constitutional powers is the president exercising?
The answer depends a lot on the facts. Cyberattacks, as defined in this essay, encompass a 
very broad set of possible activities. But a common answer is that this is at least partly a war 
powers question, and thus the legality of such operations depends on the president’s power 
to use military force in a given instance.
The Constitution’s drafters studiously placed the power to declare war in Congress. 
Throughout American history, a strong current of thought has interpreted this choice to 
imply that Congress has exclusive (or near-exclusive) power to decide whether or not the 
country goes to war or initiates armed hostilities beyond cases of, in Madison’s words, 
“repel[ling] sudden attacks.”6
Several overlapping normative justifications are associated with this view. One is that 
requiring formal and express congressional approval ensures thorough deliberation and 
thereby prevents rash military intervention. Another common justification is that no 
one person ought to be able to bring violent conflict, and hence threats to American 
blood and treasure, upon the nation absent the most extreme emergency requirement 
for self-defensive action. For these and other reasons, including concerns that mobilizing 
military power would threaten republicanism at home, there was strong consensus 
among the constitutional founders that only Congress—not the president alone—should 
be able to take the country from peace to war.7 Some would argue that these reasons have 
grown stronger over time, as American military power and war’s destructive potential 
have grown. Nevertheless and owing to a variety of factors, over time the president has 
asserted, sometimes with acquiescence by Congress and the courts, vast power to use 
military force without congressional approval far beyond the circumstances imagined by 
Madison.8
Modern executive-branch legal precedent and practice generally hold that the president has 
broad authority to launch military strikes without specific congressional authorization to 
defend American interests.9 Indeed, the executive branch’s view of expansive presidential 
powers to use kinetic military force is so well entrenched that putting cyber operations in 
the same category may be an attractive analytic move for justifying unilateral action in 
that domain, too (as well as for justifying the president’s authority to take kinetic military 
responses in self-defense against incoming cyberattacks).
In a 2020 address, the Defense Department general counsel explained that the legal analysis 
for the military, in particular, to conduct cyberattacks looks the same as that for kinetic 
military attacks:
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The domestic legal authority for the DoD to conduct cyber operations is included in the 
broader authorities of the President and the Secretary of Defense to conduct military 
operations in defense of the nation. We assess whether a proposed cyber operation has 
been properly authorized using the analysis we apply to all other operations, including 
those that constitute use of force.10
Importantly, and elaborated below, “military operations in defense of the nation” implicate 
a much broader set of constitutional categories than just hostile applications of force; most 
such operations would not be exercises of war powers. The Defense Department general 
counsel then laid out the overall legal framework and applied it directly to the department’s 
cyber operations:
The President has authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution to direct the use of 
the Armed Forces to serve important national interests, and it is the longstanding view 
of the Executive Branch that this authority may include the use of armed force when 
the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the operations do not rise to the level of 
“war” under the Constitution, triggering Congress’s power to declare war. Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has long affirmed the President’s power to use force in defense of the 
nation and federal persons, property, and instrumentalities.11
One upshot of this analysis, he concluded, is that “the President has constitutional 
authority to order military cyber operations even if they amount to use of force in defense 
of the United States.”12
Viewing some cyberattacks as the exercise of war powers may seem sensible for several 
reasons. If they are carried out by US Cyber Command, the organization of the armed forces 
tasked with conducting offensive cyber operations, the agent is the same one that conducts 
kinetic attacks. If a cyberattack causes damage that might otherwise be achieved by kinetic 
violence, or if the target is an adversary’s armed forces, the effect is similar. If cyberattacks 
could foreseeably provoke an armed response, the consequences seem comparable.
It is questionable, though, whether the vast majority of actual and plausible cyberattacks 
should be understood as exercises of war powers at all. In other words, it may be a category 
error to analyze many cyberattacks as one would the application of hostile military force 
abroad, either as to the scope of the president’s inherent constitutional authority or as to 
any constitutional requirement for congressional approval. As mentioned above, this is 
an area of constitutional law originally conceived for particular concerns about physically 
armed violence—specifically by military forces—including the risks of American bloodshed 
and escalation.
If war powers are a special constitutional category demanding formal congressional 
approval because of the risks to American blood, most cyberattacks barely if at all 
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implicate this concern, because the risks are so tiny and remote. In modern executive-
branch practice, as in many criticisms of that practice, risk to American service 
members is usually considered an affirmative factor in determining whether a 
military intervention is of such intensity as to amount to “war” in a constitutional 
sense that might require congressional approval. Low risk to American troops, on 
the flip side, may help justify presidential unilateralism.13 Personnel conducting 
cyberattacks are physically and temporally distant from actions that might seem 
conceptually analogous to “combat.” Of course, it has long been the case that military 
violence can be carried out remotely, with limited direct risks to American service 
members. Drone strikes are an obvious modern-day example, but even well before 
then, advances in aviation and munitions technology made possible massive bombing 
campaigns with low risk to American pilots. Missiles, of course, can deliver huge payloads 
from great distances.
Cyberattacks take human remoteness to an extreme, though, by placing no American lives 
immediately at risk. Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, they rarely even 
place foreign lives at risk (at least not directly). That human remoteness alleviates some 
concerns underlying arguments for congressional approval requirements, but it exacerbates 
others because the relative invisibility of cyberattacks means that political checks function 
weakly. As Jack Goldsmith and I have argued about “light-footprint” tools, including cyber-
operations and drone attacks:
Light-footprint warfare is still lethal and very consequential warfare, and the lightness of 
the tools make them relatively easy for a President to deploy extensively. Light-footprint 
warfare thus has large foreign policy, strategic, and reputational consequences for the 
United States, akin to much heavier deployments, yet much less public examination. The 
President’s legal theories treat this as a feature of such warfare. But it is also a bug for U.S. 
democracy, since the stealthy features mean that public debate and political checks—
which reduce error as well as excess, and promote legitimacy—function ineffectively.14
Another important reason why war powers may be special—and why many argue that 
requirements of formal congressional approval are needed—is the risk of violent escalation. 
A common argument is that congressional approval (following careful interbranch 
deliberation) is especially important for measures that are likely to provoke armed 
retaliation. In recent decades, executive-branch practice and legal justifications have 
acknowledged this factor, too, in assessing whether a military intervention rises to the 
level of “war” perhaps requiring congressional authorization. In its 2018 opinion justifying 
President Trump’s air attacks against Syria, for example, the Justice Department’s Office of 
Legal Counsel considered this variable, noting that steps taken to reduce the probability of 
military reprisals strengthened the argument that the strikes were within the president’s 
authority.15 Inversely, if cyberattacks are likely to provoke violent responses, then arguably 
they ought to require congressional sign-off.
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Real-world experience is still limited, and the escalation dynamics of cyberattacks are not 
yet well understood. That said, some studies suggest that cyberattacks are on the whole 
less likely than are kinetic attacks to provoke violent responses.16 Some experimental 
data from crisis simulations indicates that even when they have destructive effects 
similar to those of conventional attacks, cyberattacks might not have the same political 
and emotional impacts that create pressures for violent retaliation (or even retaliation in 
cyberspace).17 Other empirical and survey data show that, unlike conventional military 
attacks, cyber operations are not so escalatory and that they also offer escalatory off-ramps 
by providing response options other than conventional military conflict.18 At several 
tense moments in 2019, for example, the United States reportedly chose to hit Iran with 
cyberattacks on military systems and intelligence facilities, rather than with kinetic strikes, 
in response to Iranian attacks on Saudi oil refineries and other provocations (including 
downing an American drone). That reporting suggests that the United States chose 
cyberattacks over kinetic ones in part because the former were viewed as less likely to drive 
escalation.19
Of course there may be exceptions, especially for devastating cyberattacks. Moreover, 
cyberattacks can have far-reaching unintended consequences that may magnify resultant 
international friction or the risk of escalation. For example, as mentioned in the 
introduction, malicious computer code (widely attributed to the United States) targeted 
at Iranian nuclear plant control systems accidentally spread around the world.20 Russian 
malware targeting Ukraine in 2017 quickly spread, too, and with far greater damage, 
crippling computer systems across the globe.21 Furthermore, cyber operations, whether 
intended to be offensive or defensive, will often be perceived as threatening by targeted 
states, contributing to instability.22
However, evidence does not to date indicate that the risks are high that cyberattacks will 
provoke conventional military responses. The risk is clearly not zero, and cyberattacks might 
also result in escalation of other hostile measures, including economic ones or retaliation in 
cyberspace. But the same is true of so many other instruments of state power—for example, 
economic sanctions or diplomatic recognition decisions could cause a target state to lash 
out—that we would never categorize as exercises of constitutional war powers.
Separate from the issues of direct costs and risks, another possible reason why it might make 
sense to categorize at least some cyberattacks as exercises of war powers for constitutional 
purposes is that states increasingly regard them as hostile military force as a matter of 
international law. This point is probably applicable only to cyberattacks that directly cause 
significant and direct physical destruction (say, causing a nuclear meltdown or plane crash) 
or that produce widespread harm (say, temporarily disabling a major electrical grid). The 
United States government has repeatedly asserted its right as a matter of international law 
to respond to some cyberattacks with kinetic military force, on the theory that cyberattacks 
could qualify as uses of “force” or “armed attacks” under the UN Charter.23 Many other 
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powerful states agree with this view, and many academics—myself included—argue that 
some cyberattacks are appropriately analogized as an international legal matter to kinetic 
attacks.24 Defend Forward generally involves US cyber operations well below these levels. 
Although treating some cyberattacks as uses of force or armed attacks for international law 
purposes may not be determinative, it at least lends logical support to the idea that very 
physically destructive cyberattacks (maybe a narrow category) should also qualify as uses of 
force for constitutional purposes and thus trigger war powers analyses.
The international law and constitutional law analyses need not match up this way, though. 
Formally, the relevant legal provisions differ: the Constitution obviously predates the UN 
Charter, for example, and contains an intersecting set of relevant powers that have never 
been interpreted to map one-for-one onto international law. Normatively, the UN Charter 
and international self-defense law are almost entirely grounded in preserving international 
peace and security, whereas constitutional war powers are grounded also in concerns 
about both accountability and domestic control of military power. And, methodologically, 
international law and constitutional law draw on different histories and argumentative 
strategies for filling in legal gaps and ambiguities.
In sum, kinetic military attacks are rarely the correct constitutional analogy for 
cyberattacks. Rather than a presumption that any cyberattack involves an exercise of war 
powers, the presumption ought to be the opposite: that it does not. Although this paper is 
concerned with constitutional issues, it is worth noting that according to this logic it is also 
doubtful that most cyberattacks alone would or should be considered “hostilities” triggering 
the statutory limitations of the War Powers Resolution.25 War powers were carved out as 
a special constitutional category—one that originally required congressional approval for 
particular actions and that some argue still ought to—and there should be a strong reason 
to expand the category to cover new kinds of activities. It is not clear that most cyberattacks 
make the cut.
Defend Forward and Constitutional Powers
If cyberattacks rarely (if ever) are exercises of war powers, then what constitutional powers 
are cyberattacks exercises of? The short answer is: it depends.26 It is a mistake to try to fit 
them all into any one constitutional category. Cyberattacks, as stated at the outset, make 
up a broad category of activities. They could range from taking down or even destroying 
critical infrastructure to spoofing internal communications, and many things in between, 
like temporarily knocking offline air defense systems. Depending on the facts, cyberattacks 
could be viewed as exercises of noncombat military powers, foreign affairs powers, 
intelligence powers, and commerce powers—as well as combinations of these and still other 
powers. This section uses the US Defend Forward concept to illustrate how those powers 
can apply, and it also applies them to other hypothetical or past cyberattacks that may even 
have significant and direct destructive effects.
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Defend Forward involves proactively countering malicious adversary cyber campaigns 
through day-to-day competition. Defend Forward aims to disrupt adversary cyber 
operations, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms through 
activity conducted beyond US networks—that is, activity inside adversary and third-party 
networks.27 According to the 2018 Defense Department Cyber Strategy: “[The Department] 
will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including 
activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.”28
Most operations contemplated by the Defend Forward concept do not involve activities 
that would count as “cyberattacks.” Such operations include establishing a presence in 
foreign networks, mapping those networks, gathering information, and preparing for 
future operations. Some Defend Forward activities are cyberattacks, though. These might 
include interrupting communications from an adversary military facility used to infiltrate 
US military command and control systems, inserting malware that deletes or encrypts 
data on servers engaged in malign foreign influence campaigns online, or denying service 
to networks used by adversary intelligence agencies to conduct industrial espionage. Such 
operations involve combinations of several constitutional powers.
As Military Activity
Assuming the operation is conducted by the military (presumptively, Cyber Command), 
one possibility is to treat it as an exercise of presidential power to engage in military 
activities, but not, for constitutional purposes, the hostile application of armed force. The 
president, as commander in chief of the armed forces, can take many steps using military 
forces—forces provided by Congress—that impose costs on adversaries or involve risks of 
retaliation or escalation, including moving combat forces into foreign theaters or engaging 
in military exercises.29 US Attorney General Robert Jackson offered a classic formulation of 
this view in a 1941 opinion concluding that the president had constitutional authority to 
order the instruction of British pilots by American military service members at US training 
facilities. As commander in chief of the armed forces, Jackson noted, the president “has 
supreme command over the land and naval forces of the country and may order them to 
perform such military duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or appropriate for the defense 
of the United States. These powers exist in time of peace as well as in time of war.”30
Cyberattacks carried out by the US military inside foreign networks to, for example, prevent 
or deter adversary efforts to infiltrate US information systems could be understood much 
like the training of British pilots aimed at undermining German air superiority; without 
physical destruction, they deny or degrade an adversary’s cyber capability. For that matter, 
looking beyond Defend Forward, cyberattacks to degrade an adversary’s offensive or 
defensive military capability might also be treated as analogous. Such cyberattacks include 
the reported 2019 US cyber operation that wiped out information systems used by Iranian 
forces to target ships.31 Yes, these examples may involve electronic transgression of territorial 
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borders—and that may have international law implications—but any argument drawing 
constitutional conclusions from this fact just begs the question whether and how digital 
intrusion is constitutionally significant.
Importantly, although the president has wide latitude as commander in chief to engage 
in military activities other than force absent statutory restrictions, Congress restricts such 
types of military activities all the time. For example, Congress regulates the US military’s 
training and equipping of foreign armed forces with substantive, procedural, and fiscal 
restrictions,32 and Congress has historically imposed various types of restrictions on 
peacetime deployments of troops abroad.33 Congress could likewise do more to limit 
military cyber activities but has so far chosen not to.
As Foreign Relations
If a cyberattack is intended more for its communicative impact than its military impact, it 
might better be thought of as modern-day “gunboat diplomacy.” This framing draws heavily 
on both the president’s general powers as chief executive to conduct foreign relations, 
including communicating threats, and his commander-in-chief powers to control military 
forces.34 Temporarily taking offline an enemy’s digital infrastructure might be analogized 
to overflying its territory, for example, as a show of capability that demonstrates adversary 
vulnerability.
One might object that comparing cyberattacks that destroy or degrade adversary systems 
to coercive diplomacy is inapt because the latter activities lack any direct contact with the 
adversary and its assets. After all, most uses of military force that would unquestionably 
implicate war powers—for example, punitive air strikes—are also intended more for their 
communicative impact than their direct damage. But drawing constitutional conclusions 
from this distinction again begs the question of what type of “contact” with the adversary 
moves an action into the constitutional category of war powers.
As Intelligence Activities
Many cyberattacks of the sort envisioned by Defend Forward also involve exercises of 
constitutional intelligence powers.35 This is a blurry area of constitutional law because 
secrecy precludes the sort of public articulation of government legal analysis that often 
accompanies military intervention. The executive branch has argued that the president 
possesses broad authority, implicitly derived from the president’s power to conduct foreign 
relations as well as his commander-in-chief powers, to engage in clandestine intelligence 
activities to undermine enemy political, economic, and military systems. Another view is 
that much of this power comes from statutory delegations from Congress, both express and 
implied.36 Cyber operations designed only to collect information would clearly fit within 
the category of intelligence powers, but this essay is concerned with those intended to have 
disruptive or damaging effects.
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The executive branch has at times taken the view that the president’s power to engage in 
intelligence activities includes directing some quasi-military activities, such as paramilitary 
support to proxy groups or physical sabotage operations, as well as propaganda campaigns 
and other political manipulation when conducted covertly (that is, so that the hidden hand 
of the United States is plausibly deniable).37 Whether some of those intelligence activities, 
particularly those involving physical violence, are really just a subset of war powers or 
a different constitutional category altogether—and one that did not become important 
until the Cold War—is unclear. Congress, for its part, has regulated covert intelligence 
activities by enacting procedural and reporting requirements, such as the covert action 
statute’s requirements of presidential sign-off and notification to congressional intelligence 
committees.38 Oversight statutes of this nature can be understood either as recognizing 
and limiting the president’s broad inherent intelligence powers or as implicitly authorizing 
the president to engage in covert intelligence activities in the first place. Either way, the 
resulting institutional model is one in which the president has not been required to 
seek formal congressional approval for specific operations, but is required to meet other 
congressionally imposed requirements.39
Cyberattacks conducted as part of Defend Forward will often involve the exercise of 
intelligence powers, or perhaps can well be analogized to them. For starters, the means 
of cyberattacks—surreptitiously entering and mapping foreign information networks for 
vulnerabilities—is mostly an intelligence activity;40 the difference between “defensive” 
intrusions and mapping of enemy networks and “offensive” disruptions of such networks 
may be relatively small pieces of computer code. Furthermore, even some cyber operations 
with damaging effects—such as altering data or implanting malware to disable or destroy 
digital systems—are akin to black bag jobs, propaganda operations, or covert support for 
proxy paramilitary forces, activities traditionally carried out by US intelligence agencies. A 
cyber operation like Stuxnet, which targeted militarily significant and sensitive sites and 
had significant, destructive physical effects, comes closer to an exercise of war powers but 
bears an even stronger resemblance to past exercises of intelligence powers, such as physical 
sabotage operations carried out by intelligence operatives or their proxies. Such operations 
are usually treated as a different constitutional category.
As Foreign Commerce
Yet another possibility is that cyberattacks are a form of meddling with international 
commerce, implicating the Constitution’s allocation of foreign commerce powers. 
Domestically, telecommunications and other uses of the internet are uncontroversially 
understood to fall under Congress’s Commerce Clause regulatory authority. Internationally, 
too, operations to halt, redirect, or otherwise interfere in digital information flows could 
be viewed as interventions into foreign commerce. I highlight this possibility because 
unlike the categories above, intervention in the flow of commerce is expressly Congress’s 
domain: Article I assigns to Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce. International 
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commerce is also another arena in which the US government often wields tools—in 
the form of economic and financial sanctions—that impose damage on foreign states, 
organizations, and individuals in order to advance US foreign policy objectives. Indeed, it 
is in part because foreign commerce is so connected with national defense that Congress 
exercises much of its power in this area through broad delegations; it has granted the 
president wide discretion to take economic measures to deal with foreign emergencies or 
trade disputes, for example.41
For constitutional purposes it might seem like a stretch to analogize manipulating computer 
code or digital information flows across borders to manipulating trade in goods or services. 
So is analogizing such activities to dropping bombs or deploying troops, though. Moreover, 
whereas kinetic military attacks may have incidental effects on private, commercial 
property, some cyber operations use commercial infrastructure as an integral feature of 
attack.
Of course, cyberattacks might involve several or even all of these constitutional powers 
(noncombat military powers, foreign affairs powers, intelligence powers, commerce powers, 
and perhaps others). Indeed, depending on the specific facts, cyberattacks should be 
understood to involve various combinations of them. The main upshot is that while there 
could perhaps be instances where cyberattacks are exercises of war powers, such instances 
are exceedingly rare and limited to specific extreme cases. Most cyberattacks, especially 
ones that do not rise to the level of uses of force or armed attacks under international law, 
could fit in other categories. They could also form a new constitutional category altogether, 
for which the respective roles of Congress and the president are not yet established.
Congress and Cyber Strategy
As stated at the outset, one reason to resist categorizing cyberattacks as exercises of war 
powers is that the doctrinal fit is poor. That is not just rigid formalism; cyberattacks do not 
implicate the main concerns underlying war powers law, at least not to the same degree 
as does kinetic force. Another reason to resist that categorization is that it tends to limit 
thinking about institutional arrangements. In particular, critics of presidential war powers 
unilateralism tend to focus on specific congressional approval for actions, at least those 
beyond a certain threshold. It may seem natural, under that view, to demand specific 
congressional approval for cyberattacks or cyber campaigns beyond a certain threshold, too. 
Proponents of presidential war powers unilateralism, meanwhile, tend to see congressional 
regulation of such powers as dangerous, if not constitutionally suspect, meddling.
By contrast, the catalog of constitutional powers in the previous section, each of which 
involves potent tools of international competition and conflict, brings along a wide array 
of institutional arrangements. Moreover, to those who worry about executive unilateralism 
with regard to cyber operations—and who therefore seek to bolster congressional 
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checks and oversight—that catalog offers many more and stronger legal justifications for 
congressional involvement than does a legal framework rooted primarily in war powers. 
Congress shapes the use of noncombat military powers through, among other things, 
legislating military force structures and organizational arrangements, annual appropriations 
and authorization bills, and oversight processes. The president has a very free hand in 
exercising some foreign affairs functions, but Congress can shape most of them using 
powers of its own. Congress regulates intelligence largely through special oversight and 
statutory procedural requirements, and, especially when national security is involved, 
it often regulates international commerce through broad delegations of authority to the 
executive branch.
As Robert Chesney has shown, Congress is already quite engaged in shaping US cyber 
strategy, including pushing and facilitating more assertive uses of military cyber operations 
against particular adversaries.42 That congressional involvement includes a wide range of 
institutional arrangements typical of coercive tools besides military force.
Congress has pressed the Defense Department to build up its offensive cyber capacity 
through annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs),43 for example. It has 
clarified the Defense Department’s authority to conduct offensive cyber operations,44 
thereby strengthening its position within the executive branch. Congress has also tried to 
streamline the internal executive-branch approval of cyber operations while setting outer 
boundaries on how those operations should be conducted. For example, it has provided 
clearer statutory authority for the Defense Department to conduct wide-ranging clandestine 
cyber operations considered short of hostilities, including in areas where hostilities are 
not occurring, thereby enabling quicker and more flexible Defense Department action in 
countering cyber adversaries outside US computer networks.45
Congress has acted to enhance oversight of cyberattacks, mandating special reporting 
requirements to the armed services committees for offensive and “sensitive” military 
cyber operations.46 Cyberattacks conducted as covert action by the CIA are reported 
separately to the intelligence committees under long-standing arrangements, as are other 
intelligence activities that might fit within this essay’s definition of cyberattacks. Such 
reporting is foundational to other congressional roles, because it keeps Congress—or at 
least certain committees—informed of executive-branch actions that would otherwise 
be largely invisible. As discussed above, cyberattacks are especially invisible compared to 
other methods of international conflict, so robust congressional oversight is arguably extra-
important as a stand-in for public scrutiny. One continuing challenge for Congress, then, 
is to design more meaningful reporting requirements, especially ones that get at results of 
cyber operations—that is, that emphasize the outputs (which are difficult to assess) rather 
than just the inputs of US cyber activities themselves. Congress might partly address this 
issue by requiring notification of committees not only of operations and targets but also of 
certain types of collateral damage or effects.
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In short, concern that cyber is an area of executive unilateralism is misplaced, especially 
when it comes to cyber operations conducted by the US military. Congress and the 
executive are already collaborating on a system built through interbranch deliberation, 
and invoking war powers—either along with a belief in broad inherent executive-branch 
authority or along with insistence on case-by-case congressional approval—is neither 
appropriate nor useful. As Chesney writes: “With little fanfare and less public notice, 
Congress and the executive branch have cooperated effectively over the past decade to build 
a legal architecture for military cyber operations.”47
It is true that this legal architecture leaves the president with a lot of discretion to engage 
in cyber operations or cyberattacks, at least those that fall below a very high threshold 
constituting war (if one takes the view that cyberattacks alone could ever meet that bar), 
without getting additional congressional approval. That discretion is a product of both 
inherent constitutional power and delegated power from Congress.
At least with regard to Defend Forward, there is a powerful strategic logic to that vast zone 
of discretion. When it comes to using hostile kinetic military force, strategy usually involves 
specific breakpoints in time and conflict intensity: as tensions with a specific adversary rise, 
the United States sustains a military attack, or as a threat grows, the United States moves 
from not using force to using it. It is often an on/off switch. Normally, the military force 
switch is off, and at a particular moment the government turns it on. At that moment, 
constitutional war powers are activated.
In contrast to the on/off nature of most kinetic military intervention, Defend Forward involves 
a constant level of cyber conflict; the United States must be continually prosecuting it.48 
Cyber Command’s chief and a top adviser recently described its implementation this way:
Cyber Command implements this defend forward strategy through the doctrine of 
persistent engagement. The idea behind persistent engagement is that so much of the 
corrosive effects of cyber attacks against the United States occur below the threshold of 
traditional armed conflict. . . .  This doctrine of persistent engagement reflects the fact 
that one-off cyber operations are unlikely to defeat adversaries. Instead, U.S. forces must 
compete with adversaries on a recurring basis, making it far more difficult for them to 
advance their goals over time.49
“There is also consensus across the U.S. government that great-power competitors are 
making strategic gains in and through cyberspace with persistent, targeted campaigns that 
never rise to the level of a catastrophic cyber attack,” writes Emily Goldman, a policy official 
at Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. Therefore, “Competing below the 
level of armed conflict and contesting malicious cyber activity in day-to-day competition 
are consistent themes across the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and 
the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.”50
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The type of continuous agility called for in such situations matches especially poorly with 
the sort of rigid requirements for case-by-case congressional approval critics of unilateral 
presidential war powers often call for. The case-by-case model is workable when there is a 
clear and visible initiation point, or a break from baseline dormancy. The vast majority of 
US cyberattacks, however, will be part of constant and largely invisible campaigns against 
multiple adversaries simultaneously. Indeed, in recent years the executive branch has 
also instituted reforms to delegate decision making on cyber operations to lower levels of 
command, too, in order to better achieve that continuous agility.51
It may well be that Congress and future presidential administrations will move toward 
a different strategy. There may also be rare US offensive cyberattacks that look more like 
discrete applications of military force. For now, though, a war powers framing matches 
poorly the way the United States actually conducts cyberattacks.
Conclusion
Cyberattacks are a national capability the exercise of which usually involves no direct 
risk to American lives, is largely invisible to the public eye, could possibly but is relatively 
unlikely to escalate to conventional military conflict, and for which international law 
and norms are uncertain and evolving. At the most general level, this essay is about 
constitutional analogies: What exercises of power are cyberattacks most like? Constitutional 
categorization by analogy is important in this case not just for doctrinal reasons but because 
how one categorizes cyberattacks triggers certain conventions, practices, and political 
arguments regarding how overlapping executive and legislative power is shared.
Cyberattacks-as-war-powers is one possible answer, but it is rarely—and maybe never—a 
good fit. There are many other categories that, in combination, better fit most cyberattacks, 
including operations conducted as part of Defend Forward. Those categories provide 
better doctrinal justifications for executive action, as well as for congressional regulation. 
Viewing cyberattacks through those alternative lenses also helps to open up a wider array of 
institutional arrangements that more appropriately match emerging cyber strategy.
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